Shahed-136 / Geran-2
One-way attack drone · also known as Geran-2, Shahed 136, Waid-2, Geranium-2
| Designer / manufacturer | Shahed Aviation Industries (Iran, design); JSC Alabuga (Russia, Geran-2) |
|---|---|
| Countries | Iran, Russia |
| Production | Alabuga Special Economic Zone, Yelabuga, Tatarstan, Russia (documented by ISIS 2024, CAR 2023); Iran for original Shahed-136 |
| Operators | Iran (IRGC), Russia, Houthis (reported), Iraqi militias (reported) |
| Estimated unit cost | $20k–$80k per aircraft, estimate (2025) · source |
| Confidence | medium |
Other published estimates
| Estimate | Context | Source |
|---|---|---|
| $20k–$30k, estimate (2023) | Israeli missile expert, Jan 2023, per CSIS | www.csis.org |
| $80k, estimate (2022) | British analyst after inspecting a captured Shahed-136, Oct 2022, per CSIS | www.csis.org |
| $30k–$80k, estimate (2024) | RUSI (Bronk and Watling, 11 Apr 2024) as cited by Wikipedia; RUSI original not retrieved | en.wikipedia.org |
| $193k, contract figure (2024) | Leaked, unauthenticated Iran-Russia documents; 6,000 units; also 290,000 for 2,000 units, 375,000 initial ask, 165,500 all-in, 48,800 projected localized | www.twz.com |
| up to $200k, reported (2025) | HUR spokesperson Andriy Chernyak to Reuters: 'up to 200,000' per Shahed | www.kyivpost.com |
| $70k, reported (2025) | Ukrainian intelligence figure for 2025 relayed secondhand; primary not located |
Reported characteristics
| Range (km) | 1000-2500 (estimates; HUR declared 1800-2500) |
|---|---|
| Warhead (kg) | 20-50 (original); 90 reported for Russian post-2024 variants |
| Speed (km/h) | ~180 |
| Mass (kg) | ~200 |
| Length (m) | 3.3-3.5 |
| Wingspan (m) | 2.5-3.0 |
Notes
Cost depends on whether build cost, export contract or Russian domestic price is meant. Air-force reports rarely separate real Shaheds from decoys.
Who uses it and how they obtain it
How each user obtains this type, from open sources (research note of 12 October 2026). Confidence concerns the route claim: high means several independent authoritative sources or an official source; medium, one good source with supporting coverage; low, a single source, a party's claim or visual similarity only. 'Contested' means a party denies it, sources disagree, or it rests only on a party's claim. Several primary documents were only reachable through secondary coverage. This is background on the type, not evidence about any specific incident. Explanations are in English.
| User | How obtained | Explanation and sources |
|---|---|---|
| Iran (IRGC) | own production Confidence: high | Designed and built in Iran by Shahed Aviation Industries Research Center (SAIRC), a unit subordinate to the IRGC Aerospace Force that the US Treasury designated in November 2022. Iranian firms also made key parts such as the engine and electronic modules. Components: Engines by One Parvaz Mado Nafar (Mado) and electronic parts by Sarmad Electronic Sepahan (CAR dispatches, 2023); engine is a copy of a German Limbach design (RUSI, via CSIS); Western-brand commercial electronics found in recovered examples (RUSI, ISIS). |
| Iran (reported receipt of Russian-made Geran-2, 2026) | import / supply Confidence: low contested | Financial Times reporting from March 2026, relayed by IranWatch and Euromaidan Press, said Russia was close to shipping Geran-2-type drones to Iran; type, quantity and delivery are not confirmed. A Kremlin spokesman called some of these reports fakes. Components: unknown (not documented in the sources found) |
| Russia | import / supply, licensed or localised production Confidence: high contested | Russia first received Iranian-made Shahed-131/136 in 2022 (CSIS: first shipment mid-August 2022) and then localised production at the Alabuga SEZ in Tatarstan under a reported US$1.75 billion franchise-style deal, with a second line at the Kupol plant in Izhevsk. The deal terms rest on leaked documents and press reports, and Iran has denied the cooperation. Components: Early production used Iranian kits and parts (Mado engine, Nasir receiver, Sadra navigation unit); later Chinese engines, CRPA antennas, LTE modems and mesh radios plus Russian Kometa navigation modules and warheads (CSIS, citing Ukrainian intelligence); CAR's 2023 teardown of two Geran-2 found 100+ parts from 22 companies in 7 countries, mostly Chinese, Swiss and US brands (as relayed by press). |
| Houthis (Ansar Allah) | import / supply, local assembly from kits or parts Confidence: low contested | The US DIA (February 2024) assessed the Houthi 'Waid-2' as an Iranian-design drone consistent with the Shahed-136 and reported its use against Red Sea shipping from early 2024; how it reached Yemen is not documented in the sources found. Iran denies arming the Houthis, who claim local manufacture, while CAR (via The National, 2026) describes Iran-linked knock-down kits for local assembly in general terms. Components: unknown for this type (not documented in the sources found) www.defensenews.com missilethreat.csis.org www.thenationalnews.com |
| Iraqi militias | not documented Confidence: low contested | No source was found that documents the Shahed-136 specifically in Iraqi militia hands; a 2025 Washington Institute analysis ties drone attacks on Kurdistan to Iranian-provided Shahed-101-type drones, and the militias deny involvement. CSIS's Shahed profile does not name Iraqi groups as users. Components: unknown |
Dossiers mentioning this type
No published dossier names this type yet.
Sources
- https://www.csis.org/analysis/calculating-cost-effectiveness-russias-drone-strikes
- https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/shahed-131-and-136/
- https://www.twz.com/news-features/what-does-a-shahed-136-really-cost
- https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/alabugas-greatly-expanded-production-rate-of-shahed-136-drones
Cost figures are published estimates from third parties and vary widely; they are not DroneLedger assessments. Corrections: About, corrections & privacy.
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