Shahed-136 / Geran-2

Designed and built in Iran by Shahed Aviation Industries Research Center (SAIRC), a unit subordinate to the IRGC Aerospace Force that the US Treasury designated in November 2022. Iranian firms also made key parts such as the engine and electronic modules.

Компоненти: Engines by One Parvaz Mado Nafar (Mado) and electronic parts by Sarmad Electronic Sepahan (CAR dispatches, 2023); engine is a copy of a German Limbach design (RUSI, via CSIS); Western-brand commercial electronics found in recovered examples (RUSI, ISIS).

home.treasury.gov conflictarm.org missilethreat.csis.org

Financial Times reporting from March 2026, relayed by IranWatch and Euromaidan Press, said Russia was close to shipping Geran-2-type drones to Iran; type, quantity and delivery are not confirmed. A Kremlin spokesman called some of these reports fakes. Shown as a reported plan, not as a realised import; the route is left as not documented.

Компоненти: unknown (not documented in the sources found)

www.iranwatch.org euromaidanpress.com

Russia first received Iranian-made Shahed-131/136 in 2022 (CSIS: first shipment mid-August 2022) and then localised production at the Alabuga SEZ in Tatarstan under a reported US$1.75 billion franchise-style deal, with a second line at the Kupol plant in Izhevsk. The deal terms rest on leaked documents and press reports, and Iran has denied the cooperation. Shown as localised production: the reported franchise deal rests on leaked documents and Iran denies it, so a licence is not established.

Компоненти: Early production used Iranian kits and parts (Mado engine, Nasir receiver, Sadra navigation unit); later Chinese engines, CRPA antennas, LTE modems and mesh radios plus Russian Kometa navigation modules and warheads (CSIS, citing Ukrainian intelligence); CAR's 2023 teardown of two Geran-2 found 100+ parts from 22 companies in 7 countries, mostly Chinese, Swiss and US brands (as relayed by press).

www.csis.org isis-online.org conflictarm.org

The US DIA (February 2024) assessed the Houthi 'Waid-2' as an Iranian-design drone consistent with the Shahed-136 and reported its use against Red Sea shipping from early 2024; how it reached Yemen is not documented in the sources found. Iran denies arming the Houthis, who claim local manufacture, while CAR (via The National, 2026) describes Iran-linked knock-down kits for local assembly in general terms. The route for this specific type is therefore left as not documented; import of Iranian systems or kits is a hypothesis from general reporting, not established for this type.

Компоненти: unknown for this type (not documented in the sources found)

www.defensenews.com missilethreat.csis.org www.thenationalnews.com

No source was found that documents the Shahed-136 specifically in Iraqi militia hands; a 2025 Washington Institute analysis ties drone attacks on Kurdistan to Iranian-provided Shahed-101-type drones, and the militias deny involvement. CSIS's Shahed profile does not name Iraqi groups as users.

Компоненти: unknown

washingtoninstitute.org missilethreat.csis.org