Samad-1 / Samad-2 / Samad-3 (Houthi)
One-way attack drone · also known as Samad-1, Samad-2, Samad-3, Samad-4, UAV-X (UN Panel designation for Samad-2)
| Designer / manufacturer | Houthi (Ansar Allah) per own claims; Iranian design or supply assessed by Oryx and others |
|---|---|
| Countries | Yemen, Iran (alleged) |
| Production | unknown; Houthi-held Yemen per Houthi claim, Iranian role disputed |
| Operators | Houthis (Ansar Allah) |
| Estimated unit cost | No published estimate found |
| Confidence | low |
Reported characteristics
| samad-2 | {'rangeKm': 'up to 1500 (Wilson Center, Houthi claims)', 'warheadKg': 'up to 18'} |
|---|---|
| samad-3 | {'rangeKm': 'up to 1800 (Wilson Center); 1500 (Defense Post)', 'warheadKg': 'up to 18', 'speedKmh': '250 (Defense Post)'} |
Notes
Specifications are Houthi claims or analyst estimates and differ between sources. The UN Panel found Houthi-territory launches could not explain some attacks on Saudi targets.
Who uses it and how they obtain it
How each user obtains this type, from open sources (research note of 12 October 2026). Confidence concerns the route claim: high means several independent authoritative sources or an official source; medium, one good source with supporting coverage; low, a single source, a party's claim or visual similarity only. 'Contested' means a party denies it, sources disagree, or it rests only on a party's claim. Several primary documents were only reachable through secondary coverage. This is background on the type, not evidence about any specific incident. Explanations are in English.
| User | How obtained | Explanation and sources |
|---|---|---|
| Houthis (Ansar Allah) | local assembly from kits or parts, import / supply Confidence: medium contested | The UN Panel (S/2020/70, via Washington Institute) judged that the delta-wing UAVs used in the September 2019 Aramco attack were probably made outside Yemen, most likely in Iran, and the DIA (2024) calls the Sammad a version of Iran's Sayad. CAR (2026, via The National) describes Iran-linked knock-down kits and local assembly, while the Houthis claim indigenous design and Iran denies arming them. Components: UN Panel (2020): smuggled UAV parts from Japan, China and the Czech Republic (fuel-system parts) and engines from Iran and Germany; engines are unlicensed copies of the AR-731 or MDR-208; intermediaries in Hong Kong, Bangkok, Athens, Tehran, Muscat and Abu Dhabi. CAR (via The National, May 2026): only about 5% of 800+ components from Red Sea seizures were Iranian, the rest from 16 other jurisdictions (all weapon types). www.washingtoninstitute.org www.defensenews.com www.thenationalnews.com |
Dossiers mentioning this type
No published dossier names this type yet.
Sources
- https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/houthi-arsenal
- https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2021/03/houthi-rebels-unveil-host-of-weaponry.html
- https://scienceandglobalsecurity.org/archive/sgs28voskuijl.pdf
Cost figures are published estimates from third parties and vary widely; they are not DroneLedger assessments. Corrections: About, corrections & privacy.
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