Comparison set incomplete: independent precedents and counterexamples are missing. Definitions apply to future collection from 28 October 2026, not a preregistered historical sample. No probability is available.
Conflict reports · Iran / Israel / neighbours
↓ Evidence & counterexamplesConflict and active air defences can create civil aviation risks that prompt advisories or temporary closures.0/0 · Comparison set not yet assembled; no probability7 days
Definition fixed for future collection · original English
At least 3 conflict dossiers in 7 days in IR/IL/IQ/JO/LB; independently verify drone involvement and common escalation before enrolment. → New EASA avoid-airspace CZIB or state NOTAM closure in affected FIR within 7 days; count episode once, even if multiple advisories.
Iran fired hundreds of drones and missiles towards Israel.
Open Government Licence v3.0 except where otherwise stated
Research notes · not in k/n · original English
2024-04-13/14: EASA confirms temporary NOTAM closures in Israel, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and Iran and expiry on 14 April. Short-lived closures do not prove persistent restrictions.
Reproduction authorised with source acknowledgement, unless otherwise stated
2025-06-13: EASA regional CZIB follows escalation; ceasefire on 24 June 2025. Need original first-issue archived bulletin and independent trigger chronology for a fixed-sample case.
Reproduction authorised with source acknowledgement, unless otherwise stated
Positive authority outcome within the escalation, but do not infer a new EASA avoid-airspace CZIB. Three archive-trigger dossiers / same-escalation eligibility have not been reconstructed; kept outside the calibrated cases. Measured: EASA 14 April 2024: NOTAM closures in 5 named airspaces (Israel, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Iran), all expired that day.
All of these NOTAMs have expired in the course of today, April 14).
Reproduction authorised with source acknowledgement, unless otherwise stated
The original 13 June announcement and revised bulletin were both read. No counterexample implied by pre-existing advisories. Independent drone-trigger source DPPA and UK Parliament were blocked at robots; trigger threshold remains unresolved, so not enrolled. Measured: CZIB 2025-02 R2: issue 13/06/2025, revision 30/06/2025, valid until 07/07/2025; 5 affected FIRs.
Reproduction authorised with source acknowledgement, unless otherwise stated
FAA describes Iranian deconfliction NOTAMs before April 13 and during April 19, 2024, plus January 2024 UAS/missile operations. An existing FAA prohibition is not a new within-7-day warning, and cannot prove no EASA or state notice. Not an observed:false case. Measured: FAA SFAR 117 extension effective 3 October 2024; expiration moved October 31, 2024 → October 31, 2027. FAA traces original Tehran prohibition to KICZ A0002/20 on January 7, 2020.
U.S. government text: public domain; no third-party data redistributed
Missing evidence · original English
EASA first issue on 13 June 2025 and 5 temporary state closures in April 2024 verified. Drone-trigger / ≥3 dossier eligibility and independent episode selection still need reconstruction.
No complete 7-day authority-notice history for a qualified no-new-advisory escalation; absence from search is not observed:false.
FAA SFAR/NOTAM history was read, but an unchanged FAA prohibition does not establish absence of EASA or state NOTAMs. April and June observations are research notes, not enrolled cases.
Conflict-zone aviation advisories
↓ Evidence & counterexamplesAirspace restrictions force operators to choose available corridors, potentially rerouting civil flights.0/0 · Comparison set not yet assembled; no probability7 days
Definition fixed for future collection · original English
A new avoid-airspace advisory or state closure for affected FIR after a verified regional escalation. → At least 10 civil flights explicitly attributed to conflict rerouting by the network authority within 7 days; exclude weather reroutes and cancellations.
Reproduction authorised with source acknowledgement, unless otherwise stated
Research notes · not in k/n · original English
2024-04-17 overview covering 8–14 April: reports many reroutings after closures on 13 April, but does not give a rerouting count. Network traffic grew 2.7% week-on-week; broad traffic decline is not interchangeable with rerouting.
Copyright EUROCONTROL; reuse terms for this report unconfirmed; short attributed excerpt only; review required
2025-07-08 report: documents rerouting after 12–13 June closures; network-wide June flights total 1,037,256. That monthly network total is not a count of conflict reroutes. The 513 reroutes elsewhere in this report concern weather and must be excluded.
Copyright EUROCONTROL; reuse terms for this report unconfirmed; short attributed excerpt only; review required
Zero measured conflict-reroute counts supplied. Expiry of a NOTAM is not evidence that fewer than 10 flights rerouted. Neither cancellations nor network totals meet the effect definition. Measured: EASA: closures expired April 14, 2024; 5 named airspaces affected.
All of these NOTAMs have expired in the course of today, April 14).
Reproduction authorised with source acknowledgement, unless otherwise stated
Missing evidence · original English
Two measured counts of ≥10 civil flights explicitly rerouted because of conflict within 7 days, and a fully observed counterexample, remain absent. No zero inferred from missing counts.
Below activation threshold · 2 / 30 Dossiers / days
Comparison set incomplete: independent precedents and counterexamples are missing. Definitions apply to future collection from 28 October 2026, not a preregistered historical sample. No probability is available.
Reported oil-facility incidents · Russia / Ukraine
↓ Evidence & counterexamplesDisrupted refining can reduce fuel supply and prompt export restrictions; repairs and spare capacity can offset losses.1/1 · Comparison set not yet assembled; no probability60 days
Definition fixed for future collection · original English
At least 3 oil-facility dossiers in 30 days in one country (RU or UA). Activation is a broad screening proxy: refinery/terminal identity and confirmed outage require manual verification. Do not pool RU and UA for probability. → A new national gasoline export ban or restriction announced within 60 days, compared with rules at episode start.
lift the temporary ban on exports of gasoline from Russia starting on November 17
Copyright Interfax. Republication/redistribution requires permission; no open licence. Short attributed excerpt and facts only; no bulk reuse.
Occurred · 2024-02-03
Russia Q1 2024 oil-facility episode: three verified refinery/processing outages by 3 February; counted once · 29 February 2024 government announcement: 6M gasoline-export restriction, March 1 through August 31. OIES table 2 dates Ust Luga January 21, Tuapse January 25, Volgograd February 03; Volgograd unit restarted February 21. Baseline: prior gasoline ban lifted November 17, 2023, per the Energy Ministry report.
Restrictions on gasoline exports have been introduced for 6M - from March 1 through August 31.
Copyright Interfax. Republication/redistribution requires permission; no open licence. Short attributed excerpt and facts only; no bulk reuse.
Research notes · not in k/n · original English
2024-04-12: IEA describes Russian refinery outages and product-market unease. This overview supplies no measured export-ban effect. UA evidence must be collected separately; electrical-grid hits are not oil-facility cases.
Russian refinery outages added to product market unease
CC BY 4.0 (web overview; full report has separate terms)
June 2024 analysis: Russian retail fuel prices remained stable; the cited Belarus import was less than 0.5% of one week’s consumption. Counterpoint to inevitable nationwide shortages, not an export-ban counterexample under our definition.
Copyright Carnegie; no open reuse licence verified; short attributed excerpt only
Policy relaxation is established. A second independent eligible wave and complete 60-day history without a NEW restriction are not yet matched; not enrolled as observed:false. March and April 2024 hits are part of the same campaign, not independent successes. Measured: 21 May 2024: producers permitted to export until June 30; original restriction March 1–August 31.
suspending the temporary ban on gasoline exports for fuel producers until June 30, 2024.
Copyright Interfax. Republication/redistribution requires permission; no open licence. Short attributed excerpt and facts only; no bulk reuse.
An extension is not automatically a new ban. A January wave and complete subsequent 60-day observation need matching; a single dated statement cannot establish absence over the whole window. Measured: 31 January 2025: existing non-producer ban extended to February 28; producers still exempt.
Copyright Interfax. Republication/redistribution requires permission; no open licence. Short attributed excerpt and facts only; no bulk reuse.
A genuinely broader restriction than the pre-existing non-producer ban. Do not enrol until three qualifying refinery outages within the preceding episode, episode onset and independence are verified; original government.ru decree remains unread because the host timed out. Measured: 28 July 2025: restrictions extended to producers through 31 August 2025, inclusive.
ограничения на экспорт бензина на непосредственных производителей нефтепродуктов.
Copyright Interfax. Republication/redistribution requires permission; no open licence. Short attributed excerpt and facts only; no bulk reuse.
Do not count the July, August and September extensions as separate independent refinery crises. A changed expiry alone does not prove a newly triggered ban. Measured: 30 September 2025: gasoline restriction extended to December 31, 2025 for all exporters, including producers.
until December 31, 2025 inclusive for all exporters
Copyright Interfax. Republication/redistribution requires permission; no open licence. Short attributed excerpt and facts only; no bulk reuse.
Missing evidence · original English
One retrospective observed policy case is recorded, but prospective sampling eligibility / exact onset and 60-day quiet-period audit remain incomplete; comparisonReady stays false.
Second independent refinery-wave precedent and a fully observed 60-day no-new-restriction counterexample missing. Do not count 2024 subwaves or 2025 extensions as independent crises.
Original government.ru decrees unavailable (connection timeout). Interfax is a readable relay, not an open-licensed primary decree. Confirm decrees and RU-specific throughput; UA remains separate.
Fuel production & export restrictions
↓ Evidence & counterexamplesLess export supply may tighten importing markets, but demand and alternative suppliers also set prices.0/0 · Comparison set not yet assembled; no probability60 days
Definition fixed for future collection · original English
An independently verified new national gasoline export restriction after an eligible energy episode. → EU weekly automotive diesel price (tax-inclusive, EUR/litre) rises at least 5% from last pre-restriction observation within 60 days; freeze series and country weights before enrolment.
Russian refinery outages added to product market unease
CC BY 4.0 (web overview; full report has separate terms)
Research notes · not in k/n · original English
2024-04-05: IEA reports Brent above $90/bbl, nearly $8/bbl above early March. This is crude, not EU diesel, and several simultaneous drivers are named; not an eligible fuel-price precedent.
Russian refinery outages added to product market unease
CC BY 4.0 (web overview; full report has separate terms)
This establishes an export-policy observation only. No dated weighted EU diesel price series was collected; not a price case. Measured: Gasoline export restriction announced February 29, 2024: March 1–August 31.
Below activation threshold · 0 / 30 Dossiers / days
Comparison set incomplete: independent precedents and counterexamples are missing. Definitions apply to future collection from 28 October 2026, not a preregistered historical sample. No probability is available.
Maritime reports · Yemen / Red Sea region
↓ Evidence & counterexamplesShip attacks can cause operators to divert away from the Red Sea, reducing traffic through its chokepoints.0/0 · Comparison set not yet assembled; no probability30 days
Definition fixed for future collection · original English
At least 3 maritime dossiers in 30 days; verify each is Red Sea/Bab el-Mandeb before enrolment. Country filter YE/ER/DJ is a screening proxy, not a sea boundary. → Mean daily Suez vessel transit count over first 30 days drops at least 20% against preceding 30 days.
Copyright retained; no open licence verified. Short attributed excerpt and facts only.
Research notes · not in k/n · original English
2024-01 to 2024-08: EIA reports Bab el-Mandeb oil flows of 4.0 million b/d versus 8.7 million b/d in full-year 2023. This is oil volume and mismatched reference periods, not the defined Suez vessel-count outcome.
decreased by more than 50% in the first eight months of 2024
Public domain EIA text; third-party Vortexa data rights reserved; no underlying dataset redistributed
Full SIS summary read. Annual counts are not the first and preceding 30-day means. One Red Sea campaign, not independent positive cases. Direct SCA PDFs quarantined because initial robots checks conflicted (403/404).
Copyright retained; no open licence verified. Short attributed excerpt and facts only.
A measured early-crisis counterpoint, not observed:false under the registered exact preceding-30-day definition. Attacks began late in the calendar month, so most of this observation precedes the escalation; do not combine with 2024 as an independent crisis. Original SCA report remains quarantined.
2,264 ships crossed the waterway in both directions in November 2023
Copyright Anadolu; no open licence verified. Facts and short attributed excerpt only; no article redistribution.
Missing evidence · original English
Official SIS summary of SCA annual vessel counts read. Exact daily counts for first and preceding 30-day windows absent; annual declines are not eligible cases. Direct SCA reports quarantined after conflicting robots responses (403/404).
One 2023–25 campaign cannot supply two independent crises. A dated Anadolu November 2023 year-on-year counterpoint was read, but is not a matched first/preceding-30-day counterexample; missing data is not observed:false.
IMF PortWatch not used: prior robots 429; current main-site robots 404 does not authorise PortWatch or its terms. UNCTAD robots 403 respected. Match offshore triggers geographically before enrolment.
Suez / Bab el-Mandeb traffic
↓ Evidence & counterexamplesAvoiding chokepoints adds sailing distance and time, increasing operating costs and potentially freight rates.0/0 · Comparison set not yet assembled; no probability30 days
Definition fixed for future collection · original English
A verified 20% drop in Suez transit counts in a non-overlapping 30-day period. → Shanghai-Europe container spot freight index rises at least 20% from last pre-episode observation within 30 days; specify provider/licence before enrolment.
the average spot rate has increased by 181% from mid-December to USD 4 640 per FEU
Copyright retained; no open licence verified. Facts and a short attributed excerpt only; no article or underlying data redistribution.
Research notes · not in k/n · original English
2024-06-11: EIA route comparison gives about 15 days additional sailing from Arabian Sea to Europe via the Cape. This is a route-time comparison, not a dated freight-index outcome.
Public domain EIA text; third-party Vortexa data rights reserved; no underlying dataset redistributed
Observed source figures, not the 23 January forecast for 2 February. Route is Far East–North Europe, not the registered Shanghai–Europe index. No frozen provider/licence or exact eligible 30-day transit trigger; not enrolled. Same crisis as the SCA observations. Measured: 19 January 2024: Far East–North Europe average spot rate USD 4 640 per FEU, +181% from mid-December.
the average spot rate has increased by 181% from mid-December to USD 4 640 per FEU
Copyright retained; no open licence verified. Facts and a short attributed excerpt only; no article or underlying data redistribution.
Not a spot-rate counterexample: the index covers long-term contracts and expiry of old contracts. Do not mix series to manufacture observed:false. Same Red Sea crisis, not independent. Measured: January 2024: long-term XSI fell 6.2% to 148.0 points.
Copyright retained; no open licence verified. Facts and a short attributed excerpt only; no article or underlying data redistribution.
Missing evidence · original English
Open Xeneta observations now read, but Far East–North Europe is not the fixed Shanghai–Europe index; freeze the correct provider and establish reuse terms before enrolment.
Exact qualifying 30-day Suez trigger, two independent observed spot-rate cases and one same-series non-rise counterexample absent. Long-term XSI decline cannot serve as a spot-rate failure.
Freight costs & journey times
↓ Evidence & counterexamplesHigher shipping costs may raise food import costs; harvests, currencies and subsidies can offset or amplify the effect.0/0 · Comparison set not yet assembled; no probability90 days
Definition fixed for future collection · original English
A verified 20% Shanghai-Europe freight-index increase in a 30-day period. → FAO Food Price Index first or second published monthly observation rises at least 5% versus last pre-episode month within 90 days. Global commodity index is not a local consumer price or hunger indicator.
EC website reuse policy; FAO-authored summary: underlying third-party rights must be confirmed before bulk reuse
Research notes · not in k/n · original English
EIA establishes the shipping-cost mechanism only. It does not establish freight-to-food pass-through. FAO access blocked; no source-verified food-price observation enrolled.
Public domain EIA text; third-party Vortexa data rights reserved; no underlying dataset redistributed
February 2024: the EC/FAO summary reports declining international cereal prices despite shipping disruptions, while domestic staples remained high. This is a qualitative counterpoint, not the measured 5% FAO-index counterexample required by the definition.
Activation counts published dossiers, not verified damage. A base rate is k/n comparable historical episodes, with a 95% Wilson interval; fewer than five cases means no percentage. Research examples outside a fixed comparison set are not counted. We never multiply link probabilities. Without whole-chain precedents the chain remains speculative. An indicator value is not a forecast. Forecasts require a dated indicator, threshold and deadline; resolved forecasts remain visible and receive a Brier score (0 is best). We forecast consequences, never attack targets or timing.